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RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
ENFORCEMENT OF RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

One Fitzgerald owned a parcel of land in a district of St. Louis, Missouri, in
which all the landowners had entered into an agreement of record whereby none
of the land was to be used or occupied by negroes for a period of fifty years.
Fitzgerald, pursuant to a contract of sale for valuable consideration, executed a
warranty deed to Shelley, who was a negro. Several owners of other property
subject to the terms of the restrictive covenant brought suit to enjoin Shelley
from taking possession of the property and to divest him of title. The Supreme
Court of Missouri upheld the covenant and granted the relief asked.1 A similar
case arose in Michigan and there, too, the Supreme Court of Michigan held the
restrictive covenant valid and enforceable and granted the relief sought.2 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in both these cases and
heard them together. Held, that while the restrictive covenants were not of themselves violative of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, because
the fourteenth amendment prohibits only state action which is discriminatory,
nevertheless when the state courts acted to enforce the covenants it constituted
discriminatory state action which was violative of the fourteenth amendment.
Shelley v. Kraemer, McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U. S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed.

845 (1948).
The problem of racial restrictive covenants was first treated in Gandolfo v.
Hartman.3 In that case, the grantor and the grantee of land entered into mutually restrictive covenants, each covenanting for himself, his heirs, and his assigns
not to lease to a Chinese. Later, however, the grantor breached the covenant and
the grantee brought an action to enforce the contract. The Circuit Court of the
United States for the Southern District of California struck down the restrictive
covenant as being violative of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution.4 The Court there said that the fourteenth amendment prohibited a state
from discriminating against a person because of his race, creed, or color, and that
it would be a very narrow construction to hold that a private citizen could do by
contract what the state could not do by legislation or judicial action.5 The contract itself was held to be violative of the fourteenth amendment.
The reasoning of this case has very often been repudiated, and it is now well
settled that the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment operate only against
the state and not the individual.6 It is held that the wrongful act of an individual
unsupported by any statute or judicial or executive proceeding, is simply a private
1. Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S. W. (2d) 679 (1946).
2. Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N. W. (2d) 638 (1947).
3. 49 Fed. 181 (S. D. Cal. 1892).

4. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
5. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181, 182 (S. D. Cal. 1892).
6. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1879) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S.
3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 83S (1883) ; Chandler v. Zeigler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822
(1930).
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wrong; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, but not a violation
of the fourteenth amendment. 7
Applying these principles, in 1915, twenty-three years after Gandolfo case,
supra, the Supreme Court of Louisiana declared what was to be the law regarding
racial restrictive covenants until 1948, by rendering its decision in Queensborough
Land Co. v. Cazeaux.8 There the defendant breached a covenant not to sell or
lease the land to a negro for a period of twenty-five years and the plaintiff brought
an action to enforce the covenant. The Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the
covenant as not being violative of the fourteenth amendment nor against public
policy.
Since the Queensborough case, supra, decisions on the question have been
more frequent, cases having been decided in at least sixteen jurisdictions. 9 A
review of the cases shows that all of the decisions are in accord on the proposition
that restrictive covenants against negro ownership or occupancy are not violative
of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution nor against public
policy.10 They are likewise in accord in holding that restrictive covenants against
use and occupancy are not void as being an unlawful restraint on the alienation of
the premises.11 There is a conflict among the various jurisdictions, however,
when the covenant restrains the sale to and ownership by negroes. Some courts
have held that a restrictive covenant against negro ownership is void as an unlawful restraint on the power of alienation. 12 Others, however, have held that such
restrictions do not contravene the rule against restraint of alienation, because the
restraint is not general; and so, like restrictive covenants against use and occupancy, they are held valid and enforceable.13
7. Civil Rights Cases, supra note 6; North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 151
Fed. 120, (C. C. Ill. 1907) ; United States v. Morris, 125 Fed. 322 (D. C. Ark. 1903).
8. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
9. Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 Fed. 899 (App. D. C. 1924) ; Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal.
(2d) 818, 151 P. (2d) 260 (1944) ; Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822
(1930); Dooley v. Savanna Bank and Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S. E. (2d) 522
(1945); Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519, (1934) ; Clark v. Vaughan, 31 Kan.
438, 292 Pac. 783 (1930) ; Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 At. 330 (1938) ;
Malicke v. Milan, 320 Mich. 65, 30 N. W. (2d) 440 (1948) ; Porter v. Pryor, 164 S. W.
(2d) 353 (Mo. 1942) ; Lion's Head Lake v. Brzezinski, 23 N. J. M. 290, 43 A. (2d)
729 (1945) ; Duty v. Neely, 69 N. Y. S. (2) 677 (1942) ; Vernon v. Reynolds Realty
Co., 26 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. (2d) 710 (1946) ; Williams v. Commercial Land Co., 34
Ohio 559 (1931) ; Hemsley v. Hough, 195 Okla. 298, 157 P. (2d) 182 (1945) ; Liberty
Annex Corporation v. Dallas, 289 S. W. 1067 (Tex. 1926) ; Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis.
389, 3 N. W. (2d) 734 (1942).
10. Swain v. Maxwell, 355 Mo. 448, 196 S. W. (2d) 780 (1946) ; Steward v. Cronan, 105
Colo. 393, 98 P. (2d) 999 (1940) ; Hemsley v. Sage, 194 Okla. 669, 154 P. (2d) 577
(1944); Torrey v. Wolfes, 6 F. (2d) 702 (App. D. C. 1925).
11. Swain v. Maxwell, supra note 10; Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Ad. 330
(1938) ; Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 41 A. (2d) 479 (1945) ; and see note
162 A. L. R. 180, 182 citing Williams v. Commercial Land Co., 34 Ohio L. Rep. 559
(1931) as a case from an Ohio appellate court holding to the same effect.
12. Meade v. Dennistone, supra note 11; Scholtes v. McColgan, supra note 11; and the
following cases from appellate courts in Ohio as cited in note 162 A. L. R. 180, 182:
Williams v. Commercial Land Co., 34 Ohio L. Rep. 559 (1931); Bulen v. Rice, 11
Ohio L. Abs. 175 (1931).
13. Steward v. Cronan, 105 Colo. 393, 98 P. (2d) 999 (1940); Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.
(2) 869 (App. D. C. 1945) ; Lyons v. Wallen, 191 Okla. 567, 133 P. (2d) 555 (1942)
Dooley v. Savanah Bank and Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S. E. (2d) 522 (1945).
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In Shelley v. Kraemer and McGhee v. Sipes14 the United States Supreme
Court did not overrule the law as to the validity of racial restrictive covenants,
for it specifically stated that the covenants of themselves were valid.l 5 Rather,
the court held that the state court's action in enforcing the restrictive covenants
was unconstitutional as violative of the fourteenth amendment.16
The effect of the decision is to leave the landowner with a perfectly valid
contract, for the breach of which he has no remedy-he has a right without a
remedy.
At first glance this would appear to be an impairment of contract within the
prohibition of Art. 1, sec. 10 of the Federal Constitution, for it is well settled
that the obligation of contract embraces the remedy provided for its breachl7 and
that, while a state may alter or amend the remedy provided for a contract, it may
not remove it entirely or reduce it to such a point that it remains a mere shadow.18
The Federal Constitution, however, only provides that no state "shall pass any
19
The Federal courts and most of
...law" impairing the obligation of contract.
the state courts hold that this provision is against state legislative action only, and
that a change of judicial decision does not constitute an impairment of contract. 20
The decision in the instant case is not, therefore, open to attack in that it results
in an impairment of contract.
A majority of the state constitutions contain provisions which are the same
as, or similar to, Art. 1, sec. 8 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. 2)
Such provisions have been interpreted as meaning that for every right violated a
citizen must be given a remedy. 22 When the problem of racial restrictive covenants again arises in one of the states whose constitution contains such a provision,
the court will be faced with the necessity of following the Kraemer case, supra,
14. 334 U. S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 845 (1948).
15. Ibid at 842, "We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements standing alone
cannot be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the
Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated
by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no
action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated."
16. Ibid at 845, "We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the
laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand."

17. Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 21 L. Ed. 212 (U. S.1873) ; Louisiana ex rel Nelson
v. Police Jury, 111 U. S. 716, 4 Sup. Ct. 648, 28 L. Ed. 574 (1884) ; see Louisiana v.
New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, 26 L. Ed. 132 (1880).
18. National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co., 226 U. S.276, 33 Sup. Ct. 17, 57

L. Ed. 221 (1912); Richmond Mortgage and Loan Corporation v. Wachavia Bank
and Trust Co., 300 U. S.124, 57 Sup. Ct. 338, 81 L. Ed. 552 (1937) ; Honeyman v.

Jacobs, 306 U. S. 539, 59 Sup. Ct. 702, 83 L. Ed. 972 (1939).
19. U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 10.
20. People's Banking Co. v. Sterling, 300 U. S. 175, 57 Sup. Ct. 386, 81 L. Ed. 586 (1937) ;
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U. S. 509, 53 Sup. Ct. 244, 77 L. Ed. 463 (1933) ;
Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U. S.29, 44 Sup. Ct. 246, 68 L. Ed. 547 (1924).
21. "Courts open to all.-All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to

person, reputation or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or
delay ....
" Const. State of Wyo. Art. I, see. 8.
22. Feltz v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation District, 124 F. (2d) 578 (C. C.
1945); Ex parte Wetzel,
A. Neb. 1942); Daily v. Parker, 61 F. Supp. 701 (N. D. Ill.

243 Ala. 130, 8 So. (2d) 824 (1942) ; Riggs v. Hill, 201 Ark. 206, 144 S.W. (2d) 26
(1940) ; Moon v. Bullock, 65 Ida. 594, 151 P. (2d) 765 (1944).
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and thereby flying in the teeth of its own constitution by denying a remedy for
the violation of the covenant. It will be interesting to watch the future decisions
to see whether the state courts can devise some method of giving effect to both
the Supreme Court's ruling and their own constitutions.
JoE R. WILMETTI

AUTOMOBILES-CHATTEL MORTGAGES-RECORDING

An auto, licensed and taxed in Wyoming, was taken to Colorado and mortgaged. The auto was then returned to Wyoming before the mortgage was recorded in Colorado. The defendant purchased the auto in Wyoming without notice
of the mortgage, and after default in the payments by the mortgagor, the mortgagee, as was provided for in the mortgage, attempted to take possession of the
auto. In an action by the mortgagee to replevin the auto, held: for the defendant.
The plaintiff had not complied with the Colorado recording statutel providing
for chattel mortgages to be recorded in the county where the mortgaged property
is situated. mosko v. Smith, 179 P. (2d) 781 (Wyo. 1947).
The validity of a chattel mortgage is to be determined by the law of the
place where the mortgagee is executed, if the chattel was located there at the
time. Therefore, the Wyoming court had to make their decision based upon the
law of Colorado. 2 If the mortgage had been recorded according to the law of
Colorado, it would have been valid against -third parties wherever the property
might be taken, so long as it was without the consent or knowledge of the
3
mortgagee.
This case interprets the Colorado statute to mean that the mortgage is to
be filed where the property is situated at the time of the filing. 4 The auto was not
in Colorado at the time of such recording, therefore, there was no property to
which the lien of the mortgage could attach ;5 compliance with the statute became
impossible by reason of the neglect of the mortgagee. 6 This construction of the
statute protected the Wyoming purchaser, but at the same time indicates that the
method of recording chattel mortgages upon autos is inadequate. It is quite
possible for an auto to be in another county or even in another state within a few
hours and to hold that such a short delay may cause a mortgagee to lose his
mortgage as to third parties is unjust and unreasonable.
1. (Colo.) Mills Ann. Stat. 1935 c. 32, sec. 1.
2. Mosko v. Matthews, 87 Colo. 55, 284 Pac. 1021 (1930) ; Restatement, Conflict Of Laws
see. 6 (1934).
3. Ball Bros. Trucking Co. v. Sorenson, 191 S. W. (2d) 908 (Texas 1945) ; American
Loan Co. v. See, 298 Ky. 180, 182 S. W. (2d) 644 (1944) ; McGlone v. Smith, 293
Ky. 131, 168 S. W. (2d) 566 (1943).
4. See Mosko v. Smith 179 P. (2d) 784 (Wyo. 1947).
5. Yund v. First National Bank of Shawnee, Okla., 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6 (1905);
General Finance & Thrift Corporation v. Guthrie, 227 N. C. 431, 42 S. E. (2d) 601
(1947).
6. The auto was mortgaged on October 25, 1944 and the mortgage recorded on November
3, 1944.

